Risk Register

Purpose

This Risk Register documents all identified information security risks across Maelstrom AI’s two platforms — Provii and downpipes — their current status, and treatment plans. It serves as a living document that is reviewed quarterly and updated after significant changes.

Risk Summary

Critical Risks

None currently identified

All previously critical risks have been mitigated to High or below through implementation of security controls.

High Risks

RISK-2025-H001: Signing Key Compromise

Current Controls:

• Signing keys stored exclusively in Cloudflare Workers KV with access controls
• Keys never appear in source code or logs
• Access limited to provii-issuer Worker only
• Audit logging for all key access
• Secrets zeroized in memory after use
• Multi-factor authentication for Cloudflare console access

Planned Improvements:

• Evaluate hardware security module (HSM) for key storage when key management requirements grow
• Rotate signing keys annually
• Implement split-key ceremony for key generation

Residual Risk Score: 4 (Medium - accepted) Status: Active mitigation, monitoring

RISK-2025-H002: Supply Chain Compromise

Current Controls:

• SLSA Level 3 build process
• Hermetic builds with locked dependencies (Cargo.lock, package-lock.json)
• cargo audit and npm audit in every CI build (fails on HIGH vulnerabilities)
• Cryptographic signing via Sigstore (keyless)
• Non-falsifiable provenance generation
• Transparency logging in Rekor
• ISMS Owner review (branch protection enforced; full SLSA Level 3 requires two-reviewer policy, which is a noted gap for a sole operator)

Planned Improvements:

• Enable GitHub branch protection for full SLSA Level 3 compliance
• Implement SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) generation
• Add automated Dependabot for dependency updates

Residual Risk Score: 4 (Medium - accepted) Status: Strong mitigation in place, continuous monitoring

RISK-2026-DOCS-H01: Bearer Token XSS Exfiltration via Scalar Supply Chain

Current Controls:

• __Host- cookie prefix (path=/, secure, no domain attribute)
• HMAC-SHA-256 session binding via DOCS_SESSION_HMAC_KEY (CRYPTO-006)
• Strict CSP on the docs origin restricting script-src to known sources
• Subresource Integrity (SRI) on Scalar bundle delivery
• Bearer tokens scoped to sandbox-only KV (SANDBOX_DOCS_ISSUERS); no production access surface
• Production middleware rejects docs-sbx-* prefixes across body, path, query, and authorisation header
• 4-hour session hard cap bounds the exfiltration window

Planned Improvements:

• Pin Scalar bundle hash and verify in CI
• Add CSP report-only header for early signal on script-src violations
• Quarterly review of third-party bundle dependency tree

SOA Cross-References: A.5.7 (Threat Intelligence), A.5.21 (ICT Supply Chain Security), A.8.7 (Protection Against Malware), A.8.25 (Secure Development Lifecycle), A.8.28 (Secure Coding)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-4)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 6 (Medium) Status: Active mitigation, monitoring

RISK-2026-DOCS-H02: DOCS_SESSION_HMAC_KEY Leak Forges Sessions Across Developer Fleet

Current Controls:

• Both keys held in Cloudflare Secrets Store (internal namespace)
• kid-prefixed key rotation on a 90-day cadence; both old and new keys retained for the full 4-hour hard-cap window; single-shot kid-keyed lookup (never try-both-keys)
• DOCS_ATTESTATION_ED25519_SEED held only inside the AttestationSigner closure at src/docs/attestation-signer.ts; never materialised as a JS string
• Disjoint sandbox vs production key material. a sandbox key compromise does not affect production attestations
• Production middleware rejects docs-sbx-* and mwallet-sbx-* prefixes, capping blast radius to the sandbox surface
• KV-sweep compromise response procedure documented on the asset register entries

Planned Improvements:

• Quarterly rotation rehearsal with documented cutover timing
• Telemetry on kid distribution to detect old-key persistence

SOA Cross-References: A.5.17 (Authentication Information), A.8.5 (Secure Authentication), A.8.24 (Use of Cryptography)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-3, R-5)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low) Status: Active mitigation, quarterly rotation

RISK-2026-DOCS-H03: Sandbox Feature Flag Hygiene Under Rust Workspace Resolver

Current Controls:

• Workspace-level resolver = "2"
• Sandbox features gated behind cfg(feature = "sandbox") and excluded from the production build matrix
• CI guard rejects sandbox feature in production target via cargo build --release --no-default-features followed by an artefact-introspection step that fails the build if any sandbox symbol is reachable
• Strict-prefix middleware in production verifier rejects docs-sbx-* and mwallet-sbx-* before any handler-specific validation
• Negative tests cover all four input surfaces (body, path, query, Authorisation header)

Planned Improvements:

• Add cargo deny check features to the CI gate
• Quarterly review of workspace member feature matrix

SOA Cross-References: A.8.25 (Secure Development Lifecycle), A.8.27 (Secure System Architecture and Engineering), A.8.31 (Separation of Development, Test, Production), A.8.32 (Change Management)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-9)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low) Status: Active mitigation, CI-enforced

RISK-2026-DP-H01: downpipes Control-Plane Signer or Update-Channel Compromise

Current Controls:

• Update channel is static and signature-pinned: the engine verifies the update signature against a pinned public key before applying, and pulls (never receives a push)
• Two-phase, canary-gated safe-apply with automatic rollback: a bad update that fails the post-apply canary integrity flight is rolled back automatically; the deploy token is never stored
• Licence is fail-open by design: a forged, missing or expired licence degrades to the free tier and never gates backup or restore
• The licence-signer private key is held in Cloudflare Secrets Store (control-plane account); the update-signer private key is held offline by the operator and is never deployed to any Worker, so the key that could ship code into customer tenants exists in no running system
• No-custody: the control-plane holds no customer keys, data or Cloudflare tokens, so its compromise cannot read customer archives

Planned Improvements:

• Publish each update artefact’s SHA-384 and signature alongside the channel for independent verification
• Periodic update-signer rotation rehearsal

SOA Cross-References: A.5.21 (ICT Supply Chain Security), A.8.24 (Use of Cryptography), A.8.25 (Secure Development Lifecycle)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Medium - accepted) Status: Active mitigation, monitoring

Medium Risks

RISK-2025-M001: Cloudflare Service Disruption

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare’s enterprise-grade reliability (Cloudflare-published 99.9% uptime target for Workers; this is Cloudflare’s own stated objective, not a contractual SLA offered by Maelstrom AI)
• Global edge distribution (300+ locations)
• Automatic failover through Cloudflare’s global edge network
• Business Continuity Plan documented
• Status monitoring and incident response procedures

Rationale for Acceptance:

• Cloudflare provides enterprise-grade reliability beyond our ability to improve
• Alternative providers would introduce complexity without significant risk reduction
• Zero-knowledge architecture means credentials are client-held, reducing persistent data exposure risk during outages

Residual Risk Score: 8 (Medium - accepted) Status: Accepted with monitoring

RISK-2025-M002: Dependency Vulnerability Exploitation

Current Controls:

• Security audits in CI/CD (cargo audit, npm audit)
• Using stable, battle-tested cryptographic libraries
• Monitoring security advisories (GitHub Security Alerts)
• Rapid patch deployment capability (automated CI/CD)
• Monthly dependency review process

Planned Improvements:

• Subscribe to rust-sec advisory mailing list
• Implement automated security patch PRs (Dependabot)

Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low - accepted) Status: Mitigated, ongoing monitoring

RISK-2025-M003: Developer Account Compromise

Current Controls:

• Required multi-factor authentication (GitHub, Cloudflare)
• Security awareness training (phishing, social engineering)
• Branch protection and code review requirements
• Audit logging for all administrative actions
• Principle of least privilege for account permissions
• Regular access reviews

Planned Improvements:

• Hardware security keys (YubiKey) for critical accounts

Residual Risk Score: 6 (Medium - accepted) Status: Mitigated, annual training

RISK-2025-M004: Insufficient Incident Detection

Current Controls:

• Structured audit logging (security events in KV)
• Cloudflare Workers Logs (shipped to Grafana Loki) for request patterns
• Rate limiting and ban lists (suspicious behaviour)
• GitHub security alerts for code vulnerabilities
• Incident Response Plan with detection procedures

Planned Improvements:

• Implement automated alerting for anomalous patterns
• Weekly review of audit logs
• Consider SIEM solution for centralized monitoring

Residual Risk Score: 6 (Medium - accepted) Status: Partial mitigation, improvement planned

RISK-2025-M005: Inadequate Backup/Recovery

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare KV automatic replication across regions
• Source code versioned in GitHub (multiple clones)
• Infrastructure as code (wrangler.toml in version control)
• Backup and Recovery Procedures documented
• Signing keys stored in multiple KV namespaces (production, development)
• Maelstrom’s entire Cloudflare estate is backed up by our own production instance of downpipes (we run downpipes as a customer of our own product), fully operational with scheduled, verified backups
• Coverage: Workers KV, D1, R2, Secrets Store, and zone/account configuration surfaces
• Post-quantum hybrid encryption at rest under operator-held keys (no-custody); 3-2-1 fan-out to independent, Maelstrom-controlled destinations
• Recoverability continuously proven by hourly canary integrity flights and scheduled in-account restore drills; the MIT offline reader provides vendor-independent recovery
• RPO: under 1 hour, RTO: under 4 hours

Planned Improvements:

• Periodic cross-region restore rehearsals beyond the scheduled in-account drills

Residual Risk Score: 2 (Low - accepted) Status: Strong mitigation; Maelstrom’s own Cloudflare estate is backed up by our production instance of downpipes

RISK-2026-M006: Intellectual Property Deadline Lapse

Current Controls:

• IP Register maintained in provii-admin with all deadlines documented
• IP assets tracked in Asset Register
• Key dates: PCT filing by 2027-02-26, trade mark maintenance per IP Australia schedule, annual domain renewals
• Calendar reminders for upcoming deadlines

Planned Improvements:

• Engage patent attorney for PCT filing management
• Automated domain renewal where possible
• Calendar reminders plus the deadline register in the Business Continuity Plan

Residual Risk Score: 4 (Medium - accepted) Status: Mitigated, monitoring

RISK-2026-DOCS-M01: Shared Sandbox Attestation Replay Across Sessions

Current Controls:

• Each attestation cryptographically binds session_id and client_id into the signed payload; a replayed attestation against a different session is rejected at signature-verification time
• Verifier nonces have a 5-minute TTL, capping the replay window
• Replay attempts surface as audit-log anomalies in the weekly security review queue
• Per-session and per-IP rate limits cap the value of any successful replay

Planned Improvements:

• Add a verifier-side nullifier check on the (session_id, attestation_id) pair to detect cross-session replay deterministically

SOA Cross-References: A.8.5 (Secure Authentication), A.8.24 (Use of Cryptography), A.8.16 (Monitoring Activities)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-7)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low) Status: Mitigated, audit-log review

RISK-2026-DOCS-M02: Bot Fight Mode Passive Bypass by Patient Bot Farm

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare Bot Fight Mode active on the docs origin
• Cloudflare managed challenge gate on credential-mint endpoints (POST /api/credentials/issuer and the verifier-credential mint route)
• Per-IP and per-session rate limits via KV-backed counters
• KV-sweep response procedure: wrangler kv:key list --remote --prefix docs-sbx- followed by sweep delete
• Quarterly rotation of the shared sandbox issuer identity (CRYPTO-003) limits the cumulative blast radius of a successful exhaustion campaign

Planned Improvements:

• Add anomaly detection on (unique-IPs / unique-sessions / mint-rate) ratios
• Consider Cloudflare Managed Challenge in front of mint endpoints in addition to Cloudflare managed challenge

SOA Cross-References: A.5.7 (Threat Intelligence), A.8.7 (Protection Against Malware), A.8.16 (Monitoring Activities), A.8.23 (Web Filtering)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-6)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low) Status: Mitigated, monitoring

RISK-2026-DOCS-M03: Mobile Sandbox Abuse at Scale via Residential Proxies

Current Controls:

• 7-day TTL on mwallet-sbx-* install entries (per Decision 13)
• Per-install rate limits enforced at mint
• KV-sweep response procedure: wrangler kv:key list --remote --prefix mwallet-sbx- followed by sweep delete
• Allowlist deliberately disjoint from SANDBOX_DOCS_ISSUERS so a mobile-side compromise does not force a browser-wide credential wipe and vice versa
• Quarterly rotation of the shared sandbox issuer identity (CRYPTO-003)

Planned Improvements:

• Per-AS-number mint-rate ceilings to suppress proxy-network bursts
• Telemetry on the (install-rate / unique-IPs) ratio with alerting

SOA Cross-References: A.8.7 (Protection Against Malware), A.8.16 (Monitoring Activities), A.8.23 (Web Filtering)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-10)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low) Status: Mitigated, monitoring

RISK-2026-DOCS-M04: Handler Blast Radius on Shared Worker

Current Controls:

• Narrowed DocsEnv binding excludes DEMO_TOKEN_SECRET and the playground KVs, so the docs handler cannot access demo state even if a state-bleed occurred
• Host-and-path guard at the Worker entry routes docs.provii.app/api/* to the docs handler exclusively; demo and docs paths cannot be confused at routing time
• AttestationSigner is constructed per-invocation and held only inside a single closure; no static or module-level retention of seed material
• Edge cache (caches.default) is keyed on challenge ID with a 2-second TTL (30 seconds for terminal states), bounding the coalescing window
• Code review gate on any change touching either handler requires explicit confirmation that the binding-set narrowing is preserved

Planned Improvements:

• Migrate the docs gateway to its own Worker once the developer onboarding traffic justifies the deployment overhead
• Add an integration test that verifies the demo handler cannot reach docs KV namespaces and vice versa

SOA Cross-References: A.8.27 (Secure System Architecture and Engineering), A.8.31 (Separation of Development, Test, Production), A.8.25 (Secure Development Lifecycle)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low) Status: Mitigated, separation planned

RISK-2026-DOCS-M05: Scalar Supply Chain Compromise via npm

Current Controls:

• npm audit and Dependabot enabled on the docs site repository
• Strict CSP on the docs origin restricting script-src
• Subresource Integrity on Scalar bundle delivery
• ISMS Owner review on any change touching package.json or the lockfile for the docs site (sole-operator; two-reviewer policy is a noted gap)
• Cargo.lock and package-lock.json hermetic-build posture across the provii repos

Planned Improvements:

• Pin Scalar to a known-good version with a hash check in CI
• Subscribe to the Scalar release feed for early signal on suspicious version cadence
• Evaluate Socket.dev or equivalent supply-chain telemetry on the docs site dependency tree

SOA Cross-References: A.5.21 (ICT Supply Chain Security), A.5.22 (Monitoring, Review, Change Management of Supplier Services), A.8.7 (Protection Against Malware), A.8.28 (Secure Coding)

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-4)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low) Status: Mitigated, monitoring

RISK-2026-DP-M01: downpipes Engine Self-Update Disrupts a Customer Deployment

Current Controls:

• Two-phase safe-apply: the new version is settled and tested by a canary integrity flight before it becomes live; a failed canary triggers automatic rollback to the prior version
• Verify-before-deploy and idempotent apply; backups and restore are never gated during an update
• The offline reader (MIT) recovers from archive bytes plus the customer’s key regardless of engine state
• The customer controls the update cadence (manual apply)

Planned Improvements:

• Staged-rollout guidance for customers operating multiple environments

SOA Cross-References: A.8.32 (Change Management), A.8.13 (Information Backup)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low - accepted) Status: Mitigated, canary-gated

RISK-2026-DP-M02: Customer Break-Glass Key Loss Renders Archives Unrecoverable

Current Controls:

• Guided in-browser key ceremony with a printed recovery sheet; offline storage guidance (encrypted USB, password manager, Shamir split)
• Operational-key risk disclosure in onboarding and on the Keys screen (the default two-recipient posture and the strict break-glass-only opt-out)
• This residual is stated as a Complementary User-Entity Control in the ISMS Scope and the SOC 2 system description
• Restore tests and the canary continuously prove recoverability while keys are held

Planned Improvements:

• Optional key-escrow guidance for customers who want a managed recovery path within their own control

SOA Cross-References: A.8.24 (Use of Cryptography), A.5.10 (Acceptable Use of Information)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 5 (Medium - accepted) Status: Mitigated via design + CUEC

RISK-2026-DP-M03: No-Custody Dark Operation Limits Vendor Incident Observability

Current Controls:

• In-product self-monitoring: a scored security posture with regression alerts, hourly canary integrity flights, and notification rules that page the customer’s operator on failure
• Consent-based diagnostics: a redaction-safe, signed support bundle plus owner-minted, time-boxed, scoped, immediately-revocable read-only pull credentials, so an issue can be diagnosed without a standing vendor access path and without customer data leaving the account
• The no-inbound property is what customers pay for; observability is added through consent, never a back door

Planned Improvements:

• Optional, consent-gated decision telemetry for any future autonomy features so a misfire is post-hoc reconstructable

SOA Cross-References: A.8.16 (Monitoring Activities), A.5.7 (Threat Intelligence)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 5 (Medium - accepted) Status: Mitigated, consent-based diagnostics

Low Risks

RISK-2025-L001: DDoS Attack on Public APIs

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare’s DDoS protection (included in Workers)
• Per-customer hourly rate limiting via KV counters (tier-based, fail-open)
• Origin IP obfuscation through Cloudflare edge
• Automatic scaling of Workers

Residual Risk Score: 2 (Low - accepted) Status: Strong mitigation via Cloudflare

RISK-2025-L002: Insider Threat (Malicious)

Current Controls:

• Background checks during hiring
• Code review requirements (all changes reviewed)
• Audit logging for sensitive operations
• Principle of least privilege
• Separation of duties where possible (limited as a sole operator)

Rationale for Acceptance:

• Sole operator makes traditional insider threat controls less applicable
• Cost of additional controls (e.g., security clearances) exceeds benefit
• Audit trail provides detection capability

Residual Risk Score: 4 (Low - accepted) Status: Accepted with logging

RISK-2025-L003: Certificate Expiration

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare manages TLS certificates automatically (Let’s Encrypt with auto-renewal)
• Calendar reminders for credential rotations
• Monitoring for certificate expiration dates
• Documentation of renewal procedures

Residual Risk Score: 2 (Low - accepted) Status: Automated where possible

RISK-2025-L004: Documentation Outdated

Current Controls:

• Annual review of all ISMS documents
• Review date tracking in document metadata
• Updates triggered by significant changes
• Public documentation enables community corrections
• This ISMS published transparently at maelstrom.au/trust

Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low - accepted) Status: Mitigated through review schedule

RISK-2025-L005: Loss of Key Personnel

Current Controls:

• documentation (this ISMS, code comments, README files)
• Transparent, public documentation enables knowledge transfer
• Infrastructure as code (no manual configuration)
• Production access held by the ISMS Owner (sole operator); single-operator bus-factor addressed in the Business Continuity Plan
• Standard tools and practices (no bespoke systems)

Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low - accepted) Status: Mitigated through documentation

RISK-2026-DOCS-L01: Cross-Border Transfer of Developer Pseudonymous Identifiers to Cloudflare Global Edge

Current Controls:

• Cloudflare Data Processing Addendum in force, incorporating the European Commission’s Standard Contractual Clauses under Decision 2021/914 (Module 2, controller to processor) for transfers out of the EEA.
• UK International Data Transfer Addendum in force for transfers out of the UK.
• Supplementary technical measures from Section 6 of the Privacy Policy apply unchanged to the sandbox surface, including HMAC-SHA-256 hashing of source IP at ingest and strictly-necessary cookie scoping under __Host- prefix.
• Transfer scope is minimised to pseudonymous identifiers and hashed IP; no raw IP, no DOB, and no customer personal data crosses the border through the docs sandbox.
• Transfer Impact Assessment covered by Section 4 of the ROPA, Activities 2.5 and 2.6.
• Contractual scope for the transfer is set out in the DPA Docs Sandbox Addendum Section 6 (Cross-Border Processing).
• Developer-facing disclosure in the Developer Privacy Notice Section 6.

Planned Improvements:

• Quarterly check against the Cloudflare sub-processor list for changes affecting the transfer route.
• Review the Transfer Impact Assessment when the Docs Sandbox DPIA is reassessed (the R-8 trigger list applies).

SOA Cross-References: A.5.14 (Information Transfer), A.5.34 (Privacy and Protection of PII), ISO 27701:2019 A.7.5.1 and A.7.5.3 (Basis for transfer of PII between jurisdictions; Countries and international organisations to which PII can be transferred).

Related DPIA: Docs Sandbox DPIA (Risk R-8)

Owner: ISMS Owner Residual Risk Score: 3 (Low) Status: Mitigated, monitoring

Accepted Risks

The following risks are formally accepted as within our risk appetite:

Approved By: ISMS Owner Approval Date: 2026-02-13

Risk Treatment Status

Monitoring and Review

Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)

We monitor these indicators for early warning signs:

Review Schedule

Weekly: Review KRIs, assess new vulnerabilities Monthly: Dependency security review, access audit Quarterly: Full risk register review, update risk scores Annually: Complete risk assessment, methodology review

Next Quarterly Review: 2026-05-13 Next Annual Assessment: 2027-02-13

Changes Since Last Review

Version 2.0. February 2026 Quarterly Review

• RISK-2025-M005 (Inadequate Backup/Recovery): Residual risk reduced from 4 to 2. Likelihood downgraded from Unlikely (2) to Rare (1). Backup-worker is now fully operational with hourly full, daily full, and weekly complete backups covering 30 KV namespaces, 9 Durable Objects, and 2 R2 buckets.
• “Automated KV backup exports” moved from In Progress to Completed Treatments.
• Risk register reviewed and updated February 2026. All risk scores reviewed; no changes to inherent risk scores.
• No new risks identified during this review period.
• All other residual risk scores confirmed as appropriate; no changes required.

Version 2.1. February 2026 Update

• RISK-2026-M006 (IP Deadline Lapse): New medium risk added. Provisional patent (AU 2026901546) and trade mark (PROVII WALLET) filed; deadlines now require active tracking.
• Medium/Low summary updated to reflect new risk (9 Mitigated).

Version 2.2. April 2026 Update (Docs Sandbox Phase 0A)

• Nine new risks added covering the docs interactive sandbox surface introduced in Phase 0A of the docs DX uplift programme:
• High. RISK-2026-DOCS-H01 (bearer token XSS via Scalar supply chain), RISK-2026-DOCS-H02 (DOCS_SESSION_HMAC_KEY leak forges sessions), RISK-2026-DOCS-H03 (sandbox feature flag hygiene under Rust workspace resolver).
• Medium. RISK-2026-DOCS-M01 (shared sandbox attestation replay across sessions), RISK-2026-DOCS-M02 (Bot Fight Mode passive bypass by patient bot farm), RISK-2026-DOCS-M03 (mobile sandbox abuse at scale via residential proxies), RISK-2026-DOCS-M04 (handler blast radius on shared Worker), RISK-2026-DOCS-M05 (Scalar supply chain compromise via npm).
• Low. RISK-2026-DOCS-L01 (cross-border transfer of developer pseudonymous identifiers to Cloudflare global edge), cross-referenced to DPIA risk R-8.
• Each entry cross-references the Docs Sandbox DPIA and the relevant SOA Annex A controls. Entries covering cross-border processing also cross-reference ISO 27701:2019 A.7.5.1 and A.7.5.3.
• Risk summary card counts updated: High 2 → 5, Medium/Low 9 mitigated → 15 mitigated.

Version 2.4. June 2026 Update (downpipes platform in scope)

• ISMS scope re-centred on Maelstrom AI as the organisation, with downpipes added as a second in-scope platform alongside Provii (see the ISMS Scope Statement, v1.3).
• Four new downpipes risks added:
• High. RISK-2026-DP-H01 (control-plane signer / update-channel compromise).
• Medium. RISK-2026-DP-M01 (engine self-update disrupts a customer deployment), RISK-2026-DP-M02 (customer break-glass key loss renders archives unrecoverable — CUEC), RISK-2026-DP-M03 (no-custody dark operation limits vendor incident observability).
• Risk summary card counts updated: High 5 → 6, Medium/Low 15 mitigated → 18 mitigated.

Related Documents

• Risk Assessment Methodology - How we assess risks
• Statement of Applicability - Controls implementing risk treatments
• Incident Response - Responding to risk materialization
• Business Continuity - Continuity planning for major risks

Document Information

• Version. 2.4
• Last Assessment Date. 2026-06-16
• Next Review Date. 2026-11-21 (Quarterly)
• Owner. ISMS Owner
• Approved By. ISMS Owner
• Approval Date. 2026-04-13
• Classification. Public